| The Need to Ban “Smart”
or Self-Destructing AP Mines
Despite advocacy among some in the US government
and elsewhere for the retention of “smart” - or self-destructing
or self-deactivating - antipersonnel landmines, these weapons are
extremely dangerous. In theory, a smart landmine that blows itself
up in a relatively short period of time is preferable to a landmine
that lasts for decades, and should pose less danger to civilians.
However, there will still be unacceptable risks for civilians, there
will still be new mine victims, and the clearance task (while less
dangerous) will be just as time-consuming and costly. Furthermore,
in some ways, smart mines pose even greater dangers to civilians
than do “dumb” mines because they tend to be deployed
in large numbers and scattered in random fashion.
Dangers to Civilians
- Smart mines are usually scattered by aircraft
or artillery at a rate of thousands in a matter of minutes, with
little precision; given the failure rate for self-destruction,
many dangerous mines will remain on the ground. Because of the
huge number of smart mines that are typically employed at one
time, the danger to civilians could be greater than hand-laid
dumb mines. Smart mines have already been laid in highly populated
areas. Russian mines that are supposed to self-destruct are now
causing civilian casualties in Chechnya.
- Because smart mines are usually scattered
(or remotely-delivered), there is no way to accurately mark or
map or fence the smart mine minefields.
- Civilians in smart mine fields not only face
the danger of stepping on mines that have failed to self-destruct,
but the danger of hundreds of those mines randomly self-destructing
at unknown times.
- Because smart mines self-destruct and do not
last for an indefinite period of time, some nations might compensate
by using greater numbers of mines and/or by using them repeatedly
in the same area.
- Self-destruct mechanisms are not 100% reliable.
The Landmine Protocol of CCW (to which the US and China belong)
allows a 10% failure rate. Technical experts say less sophisticated
production methods can result in failure rates much higher.
- The Landmine Protocol, in addition to self-destruct
mechanisms on scatterable mines, requires a "self-deactivation"
feature (a battery goes dead so the mine's firing chain cannot
be started, and the mine becomes inert). However, the protocol
allows 120 days (17 weeks) before self-deactivation must occur.
In warfare today, civilians often return to conflict zones in
that period of time. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the
batteries will in fact go dead in that period of time.
- Smart mines will still deny land to civilians.
Because they are usually remotely-delivered, smart mines are usually
on the surface of the ground, not buried. The 10% or so of the
mines that have failed to self-destruct (even if they have self-deactivated),
and the mines that failed to arm when delivered (estimated at
another 10%), will at least for a period of time be visible on
the ground. Civilians will not enter the area, fearing that the
visible mines are still dangerous.
- A landmark study published in 1996 by the
International Committee of the Red Cross cited the views of a
military Group of Experts (more than 30 retired officers from
about a dozen countries). With respect to smart mines, they concluded,
"Because of the vast numbers [of mines] involved, and the
complete absence of any [mine] marking, it is likely that the
number of civilian casualties resulting from a large-scale strike
with remotely delivered mines will greatly exceed the casualty
rates seen with conventional minefields.... Even the doubtful
benefit of self-destruction and self-deactivation at a later date
will not prevent widespread casualties in the initial days after
the strike. There is little doubt that the development of remotely
delivered mines has increased the probability of a major rise
in post-conflict mine casualties."
Problems for Mine Clearance
- Large numbers of smart mines will fail to
self-destruct; each will pose the same danger to civilians and
to deminers as dumb mines, unless and until they self-deactivate
(if they have such a feature).
- Smart mines that have failed to self-destruct,
but which have self-deactivated, will have to be treated by deminers
as live mines that may potentially explode. Thus, a field that
has unexploded smart mines in it will have to be cleared with
the same care as any other minefield. The time and cost will be
similar. The job may be made easier by the fact that most smart
mines should be on the surface, not buried -- though vegetation
will overgrow, sands will shift, etc. But the job may be made
more difficult by the large numbers of mines present (given the
propensity to use thousands at a time in remote-delivery). US
smart mines (Gator mines) were still being cleared from Kuwait
several years after Operation Desert Storm.
Humanitarian Law
- Weapons that are inherently indiscriminate
-- cannot distinguish between a military target and a civilian
-- are illegal under international humanitarian law. This has
been the legal underpinning for the call for a global ban on antipersonnel
mines from the beginning. While they are active, smart mines act
indiscriminately just like any other mine. Just like dumb mines,
use of self-destructing smart mines should be considered illegal
under existing international humanitarian law (laws of war).
Political/Military Problems
- Acceptance of use of smart mines will
legitimize use of other antipersonnel mines.
- Experience has shown that nations -- especially
those in the developing world where mines have been used the most
-- are unwilling to give up the dumb mines in their arsenals,
if more wealthy and technologically advanced nations insist on
the right to keep the smart mines in their arsenals.
- Poorer armies and rebel groups will reject
a smart mine only solution. They not only will be unable to afford
smart mines, they don't have the technology to deploy them. And
they likely prefer mines that last a longer period.
- Governments have argued that they have as
legitimate an argument to keep dumb mines as the US and others
do to keep smart mines. Some US policy-makers have argued that
smart mines are necessary for the type of maneuver warfare in
which the US specializes; other governments argue that dumb mines
are necessary for the type of long-term border defense problems
they face (and for which smart, self-destructing mines are not
useful). Those nations will also argue their mines pose little
danger to civilians because they are in marked and fenced minefields
in border areas only. Clearly, if one nation does not insist on
a comprehensive ban on all types and uses of antipersonnel mines,
each nation will be able to claim unique requirements and justifications.
- Some nations have claimed that it would take
15-20 years to convert their mine stockpiles to self-destructing
mines. The Landmine Protocol allows nations 9 years before the
regulations on use of smart mines come into effect.
- Neither the US nor other nations that have
promoted smart mines have also proposed an immediate ban on dumb
mines. Indeed, the US is now keeping 1.2 million dumb mines in
its arsenal, for future use in Korea.
History of Efforts to Promote and Ban
“Smart Mines”
It was evident very early in the landmine ban
movement that the large number of countries that have only “dumb”
–or non-self-destructing- landmines would not even consider
giving them up if richer, more technologically advanced countries
were going to be allowed to keep the types of mines in their inventories.
A ban on just dumb mines was a non-starter for nations like Cambodia
and Mozambique. We would not have a landmine ban treaty today if
smart mines had been deemed acceptable.
Although few people are aware or recall it today,
the United States and the United Kingdom launched a major joint
international initiative in late 1994 with respect to smart mines.
It was called the US-UK Export Control Regime and was intended to
convince nations to give up or at least reduce the number of dumb
mines in their arsenals and replace them with smart mines. It gained
stunningly little support from anywhere, much hostility from many
quarters, and the initiative died in a matter of months. Shortly
after that, in 1996, the process to revise the Landmine Protocol
of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which was largely
aimed at promotion of smart mines, failed to gain international
approval. Out of those failures, the Ottawa Process was launched,
and in no small part, that process that resulted in the 1997 Mine
Ban Treaty was based on the rejection of a smart mines approach
to resolving the landmines crisis.
Over the years, the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines was able to convince government after government that
a comprehensive ban on all antipersonnel mines -- smart or dumb,
hand-layed or remotely delivered by aircraft and artillery, used
offensively or defensively, used on borders or elsewhere -- was
the only viable humanitarian solution. Allowing "exceptions"
like smart mines or border mines would result in only marginal improvements
from a humanitarian perspective, not the kind of life-saving improvements
that have occurred already in the few short years since the majority
of the world’s nations have joined the Mine Ban Treaty, which
bans all antipersonnel landmines.
Ongoing use, production and export of smart mines
would be a major step back from existing policy in nearly every
nation, including the United States. Since the US Presidential Decision
Directive of 1998, it has been US policy that ALL antipersonnel
mines should be banned, both smart and dumb. Regrettably, the target
date for this ban has been 2006, and it is dependent on development
of alternatives. However, the US policy-makers and military experts
have accepted that smart mines should be eliminated, and the US
government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to find alternatives
to smart mines. It is also the case that the US has prohibited export
of all antipersonnel mines, both smart and dumb, since 1992, and
that the US has not produced smart mines since 1997 (though no legal
prohibition is in place).
Globally, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
has been unaware of any exports of smart mines by any nation since
the mid-1990s. Large nations in addition to the United States, including
Russia and China, have also indicated their intention is to eliminate
all antipersonnel mines, smart and dumb.
Document prepared Fall of 2002 by Members
of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines,
www.banminesusa.org, 617-695-0041 |
