Analysis of the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009, S. 416/H.R. 981

What does this bill do?

This common-sense legislation prohibits all use by U.S. forces of cluster munitions in civilian-populated areas.

In addition, it prohibits the U.S. government from using cluster munitions that have a dud rate of more than 1 percent – i.e. those that leave behind more than 1 percent of their bomblets as unexploded duds, posing a threat to civilians after the fighting ends. Based on available official information, only a tiny fraction of the U.S. cluster munitions arsenal meets this reliability requirement.  This standard reflects the Pentagon’s own policy language.  In July 2008, in response to the negotiation of the global treaty banning cluster munitions, the Pentagon issued a policy stating that by 2018, the United States would no longer use cluster submunitions with a failure rate of more than 1 percent.  While a step in the right direction, this policy also leaves the vast U.S. stockpile of old, unreliable and inaccurate weapons at the military’s disposal for the next decade. This proposed legislation would essentially put the Pentagon’s own standard into law now.

What about cluster munitions export?

The bill does not address exports, because export and transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet the 99 percent reliability rate have been prohibited by Congress since late 2007.  Before that, the United States had exported or transferred cluster munitions to at least 29 other states. U.S.-produced cluster bombs were used most recently by Israel during its war with Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon in 2006. More than two years after the fighting ended, tens of thousands of cluster submunitions continue to threaten the people of southern Lebanon.

Why is this legislation necessary?

Cluster munitions were designed to be used on a battlefield against concentrations of soldiers or armored vehicles, but they are often used in civilian areas instead. Many of the bomblets — between 5 to 25 percent or more — do not explode as intended, becoming de facto landmines for many years to come. Because of these weapons’ double impact — causing casualties during a conflict and long after the conflict has subsided — cluster munitions are one of the most hazardous weapons to civilians used in wars today.  Recent estimates suggest that the vast majority of cluster bomb casualties are civilians, many of them children.  See a report from Handicap International for more details (PDF).
Since World War II, U.S. armed forces have fired cluster bombs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and the former Yugoslavia. In Laos alone, more than ten thousand civilians, many of them children or subsistence farmers, have lost their lives or limbs to these deadly weapons. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, cluster bombs caused more civilian casualties than any other U.S. weapon.

In the two dozen or so countries where cluster munitions have been used, they have had a horrific effect. Yet, in many respects, cluster munitions are a human-made disaster still waiting to happen. There are 700 million submunitions in U.S. stockpiles that have yet to be used. By adopting S. 416/H.R. 981, the United States can help prevent the next large-scale humanitarian catastrophe before countless more innocent people are injured or killed.

What is the world doing about cluster munitions?

Over the past two years the global community negotiated a treaty banning production, use, export, transfer and stockpiling of cluster bombs. In December 2008, 95 countries—including many major U.S. allies—signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo, Norway. The U.S. did not participate in this treaty negotiation, and it has not signed the treaty, just as it has not signed the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines.

While this treaty does establish a strong international norm against continued use, production and export of cluster bombs, it cannot place restrictions on countries that choose not to participate.  Adopting the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act would help to move U.S. policy closer to that of its allies.

What is President Obama’s stance on cluster munitions?

The Obama administration has not yet taken a position on whether it will bring the United States into the cluster bomb treaty negotiated and opened for signing in 2008. While he was in the Senate, Obama voted for an amendment to restrict cluster bomb use, and in December 2008 his transition team promised to carefully review the new treaty. With so many other issues pressing for his attention, President Obama needs to know that he has support from the public and from the Congress to place further restrictions on these weapons and put the U.S. on track to join the global ban treaty.  Help change U.S. policy by urging your senators and representative to cosponsor S. 416/H.R. 981 today.

Doesn’t the U.S. military need cluster munitions?

No. The vast majority of cluster munitions in the U.S. arsenal were designed for use in the Cold War, specifically for the large-scale bombardment of massed tank and infantry formations.  Many cluster bombs in U.S. stockpiles are also nearing the end of their storage life and will become even more unreliable and dangerous.  In counterinsurgency situations, the use of cluster munitions that cause inordinate harm to civilians and leave behind hundreds of de facto landmines undermines U.S. efforts to win over the local population. For this reason, the U.S. hasn’t used cluster munitions in Iraq or Afghanistan since 2003.

Cluster bomb use can also be counterproductive for U.S. forces. Duds both constrain and endanger troops on the ground. Reports after the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq cite the negative impact of cluster bombs on both friendly forces and peacekeepers.  A “lessons learned” report by the U.S. Third Infantry Division after operations in Iraq in 2003 described cluster munitions as among the “losers” of the war. It singled out the dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM), the United States’ most commonly used submunition, fired from artillery and ground rockets.  The report asked, “Is the DPICM munition a Cold War relic?” Commanders were “hesitant to use it . . . but had to” because alternative weapons were not on hand. The report specifically noted that these weapons are “not for use in urban areas.” Field officers were particularly concerned about the dud rate of the DPICM, which was higher than expected.